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In the process of restating the principles of European family law currently underway, it should be 
asked to what extent a common European system of child protection exists and what principles and 
values it comprises. In our view this system is multi-polar and has to be built from the principles of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the instruments emanating from 
the Council of Europe, and especially from European Court of Human Rights case law. The article 
sets out and discusses the procedural and substantive principles derived from this case law. 
Although the UN Convention and ECtHR case law – applying the Rome Convention – approach 
child protection from opposing perspectives (in one case the affirming of children’s rights, and in the 
other, the right to respect for family autonomy) a trend towards convergence and interaction 
between Conventions and their monitoring bodies can be discerned in recent ECtHR decisions. The 




En el proceso de formulación de principios del derecho de familia europeo actualmente en curso, cabe 
preguntarse hasta qué punto existe un sistema europeo común de protección de menores y, en su 
caso, qué principios y valores lo integran. Sostenemos que el marco europeo de protección de menores 
es multipolar y se configura a partir de los principios de la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los 
derechos del niño (1989), de los instrumentos emanados del Consejo de Europa y muy especialmente 
de la jurisprudencia del TEDH. Este trabajo expone y discute los principios procedimentales y 
sustantivos que pueden extraerse de esta jurisprudencia. Si bien la Convención de NU y la 
jurisprudencia del TEDH –aplicando el Convenio de Roma– parten de perspectivas antagónicas (en 
un caso, la afirmación de los derechos del menor, y en el otro, el derecho al respeto de la autonomía 
familiar), se percibe, por parte del Tribunal de Estrasburgo, una creciente voluntad de aproximación 
e interacción entre ambas Convenciones y sus organismos de supervisión. La parte final del trabajo 
valora esta tendencia y las perspectivas de futuro.  
 
 
Palabras clave: protección de menores; derechos del niño; guarda o custodia alternativa; entidades de 
protección de menores; autonomía familiar 
Keywords: child protection; children’s rights; alternative care; child welfare agencies; family autonomy 
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Innovación. 
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1. Introduction: a European system of child protection?  
 
The protection of children and the recognition of children’s rights have become a 
fundamental principle of social and legal policy in Europe. The European Union has 
emphatically undertaken to make the protection of children’s rights against all forms of 
abuse a priority in its strategic objectives1. In the same vein, the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights recognizes the right of children to such protection and care as is 
necessary for their well-being (Art. 24-1)2. A significant number of Council of Europe 
treaties, resolutions and recommendations also assert children’s rights and define 
standards for child protection in many different settings3.  
 
However, beyond this consensus and these achievements, the nature, extent and practical 
effectiveness of measures to advance such rights and provide due protection in national 
legal systems remain highly variable. European countries have made significant progress 
towards reducing the number of children in residential care and replacing large-scale 
institutions with family-type residential homes, but this development has been uneven. 
Statistics show that high numbers of children – rates vary between 5 and 20 children per 
1000 – are still placed in alternative care in central and eastern Europe (including countries 
outside the EU), most of whom live in residential facilities4. Non-governmental 
                                                 
1 As regards EU children’s policy see generally RUXTON (2005, pp.19-30). Among the recent policy 
developments on children’s rights within the EU see:  
 
(i) the Communication on Strategic Objectives 2005-2009 [COM(2005) 12, 26.1.2005], in which the Commission 
identifies children’s rights as a particular priority of EU action;  
 
(ii) the Communication from the Commission “Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child” [COM(2006) 
367, 4.7.2006], which marks the Commission’s launch of a long-term strategy, structured around specific 
objectives, each supported by a series of actions;  
 
(iii) the EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child (available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16031.07.pdf) adopted by the Council on 
10.12.2007, which spell out the basic principles and objectives of the EU’s external policy towards children, 
including an Implementation Strategy that selects the area of “All Forms of Violence against Children” as 
a first priority area, and  
 
(iv) the Communication from the Commission “A Special Place for Children in EU External Action” [COM (2008) 
55 final, 5.2.2008].  
 
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 364, 18.12.2000), available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/index_en.html. 
 
3 See Council of Europe achievements in the field of law – Family law and the protection of children, version 
August 2008 [CJ-FA (2008) 2].  
 
4 GUDBRANDSSON Report (2006, pp. 36-40). See also general data on child poverty, social exclusion and 
violence against children within the EU in RUXTON (2005, pp. 41-60) with further information. 
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organizations in many countries have expressed concern about the insufficient assistance 
given to vulnerable families, the too-frequent resorting to institutionalization policies and 
the persistence of cases of negligent care or, even worse, of outright mistreatment of 
children placed in institutions5.  
 
This variability in the development of national child protection systems has many causes. 
The key factors contributing to the persistence of differences are not the heterogeneity of 
national legal systems, though certainly noteworthy, nor the dissimilarities in the design of 
rules and legal procedures, but the variety of the complex structures through which child 
protection is provided (including levels of social services and family support provision), 
the weight of professional ideologies and the different cultures or social philosophies of the 
States or communities in which child welfare decisions are taken6.  
 
For this reason, in spite of public opinion’s habitual demands for legal changes when 
worrying reports or statistics are released or when serious incidents in the performance of 
state agencies come to light, legal reform is probably not one of the most important steps to 
be taken in the first instance. The improvement of European child protection systems 
requires efforts in many directions, but not primarily in the legal field. Passing laws has 
become an easy way to avoid coming to terms with problems which require much more 
complex action. The legal foundations upon which child protection and children’s rights 
rest in Europe are sound and have been shown to be flexible enough to adjust to societal 
changes. Aspiring to build a fully-fledged European child protection system with common 
substantive rules, standards and procedures is at the present time neither politically 
realistic nor, perhaps, desirable7. As the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
ECtHR) has repeatedly pointed out:  
 
“Perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of 
children vary from one state to another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the 
                                                 
5 A good example of these shortcomings can be seen in the Spanish Ombudsman’s report “Centros de 
protección de menores con trastornos de conducta y en situación de dificultad social” (2009) (”Care centres 
for children with behavioural disorders and in situations of social difficulty”) [available at: 
http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/index.asp?destino=informes2.asp]. The report, which shocked 
Spanish public opinion, describes the living conditions of teenagers with behavioural disorders who had 
been placed in institutional care, and denounces situations involving the denial of rights, poorly resourced 
premises, forced medication, physical restraints and humiliating punishments.  
 
6 Concerning the relevance and interaction of these three factors (structures, professional ideology and 
culture), particularly when comparing different child protection systems, see HETHERINGTON (2007, pp. 33-
45).  
 
7 The EU lacks general competence in the area of children’s rights, but has to take these rights into account 
in the development of its policies and may even take positive action on them under various specific 
competences. As regards the instruments or methods for intervention, the Commission suggests resorting 
not only to legislative action, but also to soft law, financial assistance or political dialogue (see 
Communication “Towards an EU Strategy” par. I.3, cited in n. 1).  
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role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for 
public measures in this particular area”8.  
 
At present, the most practicable policy is striving for approximation among legal cultures 
by emphasising shared principles, putting differences into perspective rather than denying 
them, and creating a progressive European consciousness9. Agreement on common values 
has already allowed the formulation of common European legal principles which have 
been enshrined in many treaties, conventions and other international instruments. As 
principles continue to be shaped in international texts, equivalent legal standards, though 
not necessarily identical rules, are gradually emerging. On an academic level, normative 
convergence is being assisted by the work done by the Commission on European Family 
Law (CEFL). Drawing from the common core of family law in many European countries 
and resorting to a “better law approach” whenever there is substantial divergence among 
legal systems, the CEFL is currently drafting sets of Principles which are deemed to be 
suitable for the harmonising of family law10. Although no specific child protection 
principles have been drafted to date, the CEFL has published a set of Principles Regarding 
Parental Responsibilities which are relevant to the position of child carers (including public 
institutions), given the broad concept of parental responsibility embraced by the drafters11.  
 
An authoritative restatement of the principles constituting the backbone of child protection 
law in Europe would certainly be of great value for the sake of certainty and clarity. 
However, this would not significantly change the law in action: most of these principles 
have already been laid down in international instruments and ECtHR case law, and have 
consequently permeated national legal systems. Remaining differences among these 
systems – relevant as they are – have mainly to do with different family and social policies, 
policies which in turn are conditioned by highly different levels of public provision of 
resources to attend to social welfare needs.  
 
                                                 
 
8 ECtHR Johansen v. Norway (No. 17383/90), 7 August 1996 (paragraph 64).  
 
9 PINTENS (2003, pp. 28-29). 
  
10 The CEFL is an independent body of European academics, established in 2001, whose main objective is 
the creation of Principles of European Family Law. The Principles are primarily aimed at national, 
European and international legislators who are considering modernising relevant areas of family law 
(BOELE-WOELKI et al., 2007, pp. 1-6). As to the working method of the Commission, see also BOELE-WOELKI 
(2005, pp. 15-38).  
 
11 See BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007). Regarding the concept of parental responsibilities and the holders of such 
responsibilities, see Principles 3:1 and 3:2, and the accompanying legal references, comparative overview 
and comments (ibid, 25-33).  
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The tenets of the European system of child protection in its present form can be retrieved 
from three different settings12:  
 
- They derive, firstly, from the United Nations human rights instruments and especially 
from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)13. The 
Convention (adopted in 1989, in force from 1990) is of paramount importance as regards 
children’s rights and child protection. It is a worldwide instrument which sets out 
children’s human rights and the standards towards which States must strive in 
implementing these rights. It also enshrines child protection duties, sets out some basic 
conditions for interference in family life and details a number of measures that States have 
a duty to adopt to protect children. It has been developed and interpreted by means of 
guidelines as well as recommendations aimed at States Parties by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC). Although this is not a specifically European 
instrument, it has had an obvious incidence on treaties and conventions of European scope 
and in domestic jurisdictions, insofar as it binds all European States by international law.  
 
- Secondly, reference has to be made to the instruments produced and adopted under the 
aegis of the Council of Europe. The specific European dimension of children’s rights and 
child protection lies mainly with several Council conventions, especially the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR) 
(1950)14, the European Social Charter (revised) (1996)15, the European Convention on the 
Exercise of Children’s Rights (1996)16, the Convention on Contact Concerning Children 
(2003)17, the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse (2007)18, and the revised European Convention on the Adoption of Children 
(2008)19. In matters of child protection in a strict sense (i.e. state intervention in family life 
and interference with parental autonomy with the aim of protecting abused or neglected 
children), the focus must be primarily on the ECHR, whose system of monitoring and 
enforcement has allowed an extensive body of case law to develop. In some specific areas, 
the recommendations and resolutions passed by the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
                                                 
12 For summarized information about European legal developments in the field of child protection, see 
FERRER RIBA (2009, pp. 973-977) and DUTTA (2009, pp. 977-981).  
  
13 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.  
 
14 European Treaty Series (ETS) No 5. 
 
15 ETS No 163. 
 
16 ETS No 160. 
 
17 ETS No 192. 
 
18 ETS No 201. 
 
19 ETS No 202. 
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Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe dealing with child protection and 
institutional care should not be ignored either20.  
 
- A third pillar of the European system of child protection, of great practical importance 
with respect to children in danger in cross-border situations, consists of the treaties and 
regulations in the field of private international law. Two instruments are particularly 
relevant. The first, whose application extends beyond Europe, is the Hague Convention on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and cooperation in respect of 
parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children (1996, in force from 
2002)21. The second is Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and matters of 
parental responsibility (also called “revised Brussels II Regulation”)22. Both instruments 
aim to establish rules on jurisdiction (i.e. determining the competent authority) and on the 
recognition and enforcement in another country of judgements, decrees, orders and 
decisions pronounced by public authorities in a Member State. In addition, the Hague 
Convention also contains rules setting out the applicable law. The concept of parental 
responsibility in these instruments is very broad: it extends to the designation of any 
person or body having charge of a child’s person or property, or representing or assisting a 
child, and also to the placement of a child in a foster family or in institutional care, among 
other situations (Art. 3 (d) (e) of the Hague Convention; Art. 1.2 (c) and (d) of Regulation 
2201/2003).  
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was called upon to decide whether an order issued by a 
Swedish Social Welfare Board to take two children into care could be enforced in Finland23. After 
the order had been issued the mother took up residence in Finland, accompanied by her two 
children, who she placed with their grandmother. The European Court disregarded the fact that 
decisions concerning the taking of children into care and their placement are governed by public 
law in Finland and decided that both decisions fell within the scope of the “civil matters” listed 
in Art. 2 of the European Regulation. Thus, the Regulation was applicable and the decision 
issued by the Swedish authorities could be enforced in Finland. The ECJ ruling in this case 
                                                 
 
20 See the Recommendations from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No 1071 (1988) on 
child welfare – Providing institutional care for infants and children; No 1371 (1998) on abuse and neglect 
of children; No 1601 (2003) on improving the lot of abandoned children in institutions; No 1698 (2005) on 
the rights of children in institutions [follow up to Recommendation 1601 (2003)], and No 1778 (2007) on 
child victims: stamping out all forms of violence, exploitation and abuse, as well as Resolution No 1530 
(2007) on the same subject. See also the Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers No R(79) 17 
concerning the protection of children against ill-treatment; No R(87)6 on foster families; Rec(2005)5 on the 
rights of children living in residential institutions, and R(2006) 19 on policy to support positive parenting.  
21 See text, status table and bibliography at:  
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=70.  
 
22 Official Journal 2003 L 338/1.  
 
23 Case C–435/06, judgement ECJ (Grand Chamber), of 27 November 2007.  
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regarding the inclusion of public measures of child protection within the scope of the term “civil 
matters” was reaffirmed in a later judgement24.  
 
The broad interpretation of the Hague Convention and the European Regulation’s scope of 
application to matters of child protection, which the C. case exemplifies, greatly fosters 
international cooperation between social welfare boards or courts of justice in cross-border 
settings. While the prospects for a (substantive) European system of child protection are 
certainly debatable, it is important to recall the existence of a common (conflictual) system 
made up of rules which facilitate mutual cooperation by recognizing and enforcing 
decisions taken by any EU Member State’s internal authorities in all other Community 
countries or in third countries which have ratified the Hague Convention. 
 
 
2. Child protection in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The UNCRC was the first legally binding international instrument to recognize the full 
range of children’s fundamental rights, including civil and political as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights. It sets out human rights already addressed by other instruments, 
but does this from a child-centred perspective. A significant number of its provisions are 
central to the social and legal policies developed by States in the field of child protection25.  
 
The Convention emphasizes the primary responsibility of parents or legal guardians for the 
upbringing and development of the child and imposes on States a duty to render 
appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of these 
responsibilities, including a duty to ensure the development of institutions, facilities and 
services for the care of children (Art. 18.2). The failure of parents or other legal guardians to 
fulfil their duties may lead to the taking of public measures for child protection. According 
to Arts. 3.2 and 19.1 UNCRC, States undertake to ensure child protection and specifically to 
take all appropriate measures to protect children from all forms of physical and mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, 
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parents or other persons with responsibility for 
child care. The Convention provides a detailed list of the protective measures which States 
should undertake as appropriate: these measures should include effective procedures for 
establishing social programmes to provide support for children and their carers; other 
forms of prevention; procedures for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, 
treatment, and following up of instances of ill-treatment and judicial involvement (Art. 
19.2). States also have to ensure that institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children conform to adequate standards (Art. 3.3).  
 
                                                 
 
24 Case C-523/07, judgement ECJ (Third Chamber), of 2 April 2009.  
 
25 On the incidence of the UNCRC on child protection policies see DOEK (2006, pp. 21-31) and CANTWELL 
AND HOLZSCHEITER (2008).  
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Separating a child from his or her parents against their will is exceptional: it is only 
admitted when the competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the 
child’s best interests, as it is in cases of abuse or neglect (Art. 9.1). In the proceedings which 
may lead to the child’s separation from his or her parents all interested parties should have 
an opportunity to participate and make their views known. The separation must not 
deprive the child of his or her right to maintain personal relationships and direct contact 
with both parents on a regular basis, except if this is contrary to the child’s best interests. 
Children who are temporarily or permanently deprived of their family environment are 
entitled to special protection or assistance (Art. 20.1). States must ensure alternative care in 
particular for these children (Art. 20.2). The Convention does not establish criteria for 
choosing the most suitable type of placement: care can include foster placement, kafalah, 
adoption, or, “if necessary”, placement in suitable institutions (Art. 20.3). It seems clear 
from the provision’s wording that family-based alternative care is preferable to 
institutional care. In any event, periodic reviews of child care placements have to be carried 
out (Art. 25).  
 
Because of the nature of many of the rights set out in its text, compliance with the 
Convention is being achieved only progressively. States commit themselves to taking all 
measures appropriate for implementing the rights set out in the Convention, and doing so 
–when it comes to economic, social and cultural rights– to the greatest extent their available 
resources allow (Art. 4). The Convention, however, lacks an enforcement mechanism to 
allow for the adjudication and redress of individual violations of rights. Monitoring the 
fulfilment of the rights and obligations assumed under the Convention is entrusted to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), composed of ten international experts to 
whom reports are periodically submitted by the States Parties (Art. 44). The CRC then 
issues concluding observations, which are statements derived from its consideration of 
these reports. The progressive and effective realization of the Convention’s rights and 
obligations depends in practice on its persuasive moral force, and on national authorities’ 
willingness to heed domestic and international criticisms and pressures on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the CRC in its concluding observations. The Committee’s 
approach to the protection of children’s rights is therefore advisory and non-adversarial 
and relies on diplomacy rather than on legal sanction26.  
 
The effectiveness of the rights and achieving of the standards set out by the UNCRC is also 
fostered by the work of many international bodies, national governments and non-
governmental organizations. An important step towards improving the implementation of 
the UN Convention in the field of child protection has been the drawing up and 
publication of the “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children” (2009)27.  
                                                 
26 KILKELLY (2001b, p. 309).  
 
27 See the text of the Guidelines in the Annex of the Resolution A/RES/64/142 adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 18 December 2009 (65th plenary meeting).  
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The document originated from a research and advocacy programme launched in 2004 by 
UNICEF and International Social Services (ISS) with the aim of developing international 
standards for improving the protection of children deprived of parental care. The initiative was 
reinforced by the CRC in 2005. During its 2005 “Day of General Discussion” the Committee 
recommended the preparation of a set of international standards for the protection and 
alternative care of children without parental care for the UN General Assembly to consider and 
adopt28. Following this recommendation, a draft was prepared in consultation with international 
organizations, NGOs active in the field and other participants, including young adults who had 
experienced alternative care. A revised version of the draft, which took into account comments 
made by the CRC and other experts, was presented to the CRC by the Brazilian Government, 
with a view to taking it forward for adoption by the UN General Assembly. In its 63rd session 
(2008), the Assembly invited States to dedicate all their efforts to taking action on the draft within 
the Human Rights Council. Finally, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the 
UNCRC, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly approved a draft resolution, which 
was later adopted as a Resolution by the Plenary of the General Assembly. According to this 
Resolution, the Assembly “welcomed” (but did not formally adopt) the Guidelines “as a set of 
orientations to help to inform policy and practice” and encouraged States “to take them into account and 
to bring them to the attention of the relevant executive, legislative and judiciary bodies of government, 
human rights defenders and lawyers, the media and the public in general”.29
 
The Guidelines – an extensive set of proposals divided into 9 parts and 166 paragraphs – 
tackle all major questions posed by alternative care, including the promotion of parental 
care, the adoption of specific measures for the prevention of family separation and for 
family reintegration, the general care provision framework, the determination of the most 
appropriate form of care, and the provision of alternative care in general, for children 
outside their habitual country of residence, and in emergency situations. The main thrusts 
of the Guidelines are:  
 
- Furthering parental care, with government policies directed at the prevention of child 
abandonment and family separation, and at the promotion of family reintegration 
(paragraphs 31-51).  
 
- Prioritising family and community-based care solutions over institutional arrangements 
(par. 22) and regularly monitoring and reviewing entities and individuals engaged in the 
provision of alternative care (par. 127-129). 
 
- Decision-making on alternative care based on rigorous assessment, planning and 
reviewing, stating the placement goals on a case-by-case basis and with full consultation 
with the child and his or her parents or legal guardians (par. 56, 63-66). 
                                                 
28 CRC/C/153 17 March 2006.  
 
29 See A/RES/64/142. See also the observations made by some country representatives (the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada) at the meeting of the Third Committee (Social, 
Humanitarian and Cultural) of the UN General Assembly held on 20 November 2009 (GA/SHC/3968), in 
which the non-binding nature of the Guidelines are emphasized and certain discrepancies between the 
text and the respective national laws are highlighted.  
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- Planning aimed at establishing permanent arrangements without undue delay, through 
reintegration in the family or, if this is not possible, in an alternative stable family setting 
(par. 57-61). 
 
- Clear policies and procedures regarding the transition from care to after-care and follow-
up (par. 130-135).  
 
The Guidelines themselves will not have a significant effect on the principles of European 
child protection law, but they may do in their implementation. Their main function, in 
effect, is to serve as orientation for policy and practice. They could be of great value for 
welfare authorities and professionals, and provide inspiration for legal reforms – such as 
those which are needed in Eastern Europe – aimed at introducing higher standards of 
protection and social services provision.  
 
 
3. Child protection in the European Court of Human Rights 
 
3.1. Children and the European Convention 
 
The legal dimension of children’s rights and child protection in Europe – leaving aside the 
revised Brussels II Regulation – lies mainly in the international instruments adopted under 
the Council of Europe’s auspices. For child protection purposes, the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is the most prominent 
among these instruments. It is also the most powerful, insofar as it is equipped with 
individual rights of complaint before the ECtHR and with supervision and enforcement 
mechanisms. The ECHR is well-known not to be a child-centred instrument. Children’s 
rights and interests are absent from its text. Nonetheless, most of the rights enshrined in 
the Convention can be held and exercised by children or by parents or other legal 
representatives on behalf of children30. In interpreting and applying the Convention the 
ECtHR has built up a detailed body of case law on the scope, contents and limits of these 
rights, which represents a legal standard that Council of Europe Member States must 
respect. Parents, other family members and children bring complaints against states on a 
regular basis, claiming that their rights have been violated by decisions taken by 
administrative or judicial authorities in the exercise of child protective functions.  
 
The Court has been called to scrutinize under the ECHR all types of decisions: decisions of 
welfare service authorities to conduct investigations; the removal of children from their 
homes and their placement in alternative care; the implementation of the placement and 
other measures taken; the impingement on parental rights; the modification and review of 
the measures, and the decision to continue or discontinue them. The Court has also been 
asked to assess the relevance under the Convention of omissions and failure to take action 
                                                 
30 KILKELLY (1999, pp. 1-17).  
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by public authorities31. Rights which are typically affected in all these cases are the right to 
a fair trial (Art. 6) and the right to respect for privacy and family life (Art. 8), although 
occasionally complaints may have had a bearing on the prohibition of being subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 3) and the right to have an effective remedy before a 
national authority (Art. 13).  
 
The wealth of jurisprudential principles and standards crafted by the Court in dealing with 
these complaints for more than two decades has been and still is of enormous importance 
for national legislative bodies – which have sometimes been urged to amend internal law –, 
for lawyers and judges who litigate or are required to decide cases in national courts, for 
public officials and professionals involved in child protection in the performance of their 
duties, and last but not least, for children and their families.  
 
3.2. Pursuing effectiveness in child protection: the human rights liability of child 
protection authorities 
 
Throughout its history, the Court has showed a commitment to ensuring that the rights 
and freedoms set forth by the Convention are effective. Aiming to guarantee effectiveness 
has led the Court to find that States and their authorities have in some cases positive 
obligations to act. Violation of rights may not only derive from State encroachment on 
areas of private freedom, but also from failure to comply with the duty to take action.  
 
In family relationships, for instance, the Court has stressed that respect for family life 
involves States acting in a manner calculated to enable family ties to develop normally and 
allow the parties concerned – usually parents and children – to lead a normal family life32. 
In cases where children are separated from their families this also involves a positive duty 
to take measures with a view to reuniting them, subject to their being in line with the 
child’s best interests33. On the other hand, bearing in mind the fact that young children 
cannot pursue their rights on their own, the effectiveness of children’s rights may depend 
on vigorous State intervention – especially when these rights conflict with actions taken or 
positions held by other family members. 
 
The ECtHR’s most conspicuous move towards enhancing the effectiveness of child 
protection has been to assert that States have a duty “to take reasonable steps to prevent ill-
treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge”. When neglect or abuse is 
sufficiently serious to reach the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment, the child 
protection system’s failure to protect the victims may constitute a violation of Art. 3 ECHR.  
 
                                                 
 
31 KILKELLY (1999, pp. 160-186, pp. 263-294); VAN BUEREN (2007, pp. 134-143).  
32 ECtHR Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979.  
 
33 ECtHR Eriksson v. Sweden, No. 11373/85, 22 June 1989.  
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This doctrine was first formulated with respect to children in the judgement on the case of Z. and 
others v. the UK34. The case involved a local authority’s failure to intervene at the appropriate 
time in circumstances of known severe neglect. When the children were finally placed in foster 
care, five years after the family was referred to the social services for the first time, an abundance 
of evidence showed that they had endured horrific experiences. Proceedings were commenced 
against the local authority claiming damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty. The 
application was struck out by the domestic courts as revealing no cause of action. The House of 
Lords rejected the appeal, considering that child protection agencies face very difficult decisions 
when trying to strike the right balance between protecting the child from immediate feared harm 
and disrupting its family relationships35. The ECtHR reacted to the English courts’ decisions and 
found a breach not only of Art. 3, but also of Art. 13 ECHR on account of the unavailability to the 
applicants of appropriate means of obtaining a determination of their allegations and the 
impossibility of obtaining an enforceable compensation award for the damage suffered.  
 
In Z. and others the Court acknowledged the difficult and sensitive dilemma facing the 
social services, which had to decide between possibly taking action too soon and not taking 
it soon enough. However, it considered that the case left no doubt as to the system’s failure 
to protect the children from serious, long-term neglect and abuse and found a violation of 
Art. 3 of the Convention. It is important to realize that, according to the Z and others 
doctrine, this dilemma becomes legally relevant for the purposes of finding an 
infringement of the ECHR only on the condition that the mistreatment reaches the level of 
inhuman or degrading treatment, which is a  very serious degree of abuse, and that the 
authorities had been in a position to prevent the harm36.  
 
In a later case, D.P. & J.C. v. the UK 37, dealing with sexual abuse which had gone unnoticed for 
many years by the social services involved with the family, the Court admitted that the 
professionals involved could not be criticised for failing to instigate an investigation into the 
possibility of additional underlying problems because of the culture of absolute silence on the 
issue among family members.  
 
In any event, the duty to take positive action both to protect the right of children not to 
suffer inhuman treatment within the family home and also to respect and preserve the 
family life of parents and children necessarily creates potential for conflict. In the end, as 
two authors have recently said, the core of the problem lies in the definition of boundaries, 
                                                 
 
34 ECtHR No. 29392/95, 10 May 2001. The European Court had previously rejected the blanket immunity 
rule established by the English courts, on the grounds of public policy requirements, with regard to 
actions in negligence against the police in the investigation and suppression of crime (ECtHR Osman v. The 
United Kingdom, No. 23452/94, 28 October 1998).  
 
35 See X and Others v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 All England Law Reports 353. A summary of the 
British courts’ position in this type of case can be found in the ECtHR’s decision which reexamined this 
case (above n. 34), par. 45-46 and 57-65. See also HOYANO AND KEENAN (2007, pp. 329-339). 
 
36 HOYANO AND KEENAN (2007, pp. 387-396).  
 
37 ECtHR No. 38719/97, 10 October 2002.  
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i.e., in defining the point at which compulsory State intervention in a child’s life is better 
for him or her than offering family services, or simply not being involved at all38.  
 
3.3. The setting out of boundaries to interference in family life 
 
Action taken by the ECtHR in child protection cases normally consists of reviewing 
decisions taken by social welfare authorities or national courts which purportedly interfere 
with the right to respect for family life or violate the due process requirements of Art. 6 
ECHR. State authorities’ incursions into family life violate the European Convention if they 
are not in accordance with the law, if they lack a legitimate aim, and if they are 
unnecessary or disproportionate (Art. 8.2 ECHR)39. In most cases the final decision hinges 
upon the necessity or proportionality of the interference. Ascertaining such necessity or 
proportionality requires the setting out of thresholds or standards for different types of 
intervention.  
 
However, the nature of this exercise is not equivalent to what the national authorities 
usually do in the first instance. The European Court takes the difficulty of the task 
performed by social welfare agencies and courts into account and acknowledges that they 
have the benefit of direct contact with all persons concerned. Because of this, and because 
the European Court is not a fact-finding court, national authorities are allowed a significant 
measure of discretion. This applies across the board: a) it applies to the accuracy required 
from legislation40; b) it extends to the procedural requirements leading to the making of a 
decision41, and c) it applies to the very assessment of the necessity for interference, to 
which effect the authorities are granted a generous margin of appreciation.  
 
The review process carried out by the ECtHR does not obviously lead to the formulation of 
clear-cut rules. Its case law defines neither the standards which justify interference in 
family life nor the scope of such interference, let alone the most effective strategies for 
preventing out-of-home placements, the most adequate means to support positive 
parenting, or the practices to be followed in the transition from care to the after-care period. 
Depending on their nature, these are matters for legislation, regulations, guidelines or best-
practices codes. The ECtHR’s main achievement is the development of principles, which 
are usually formulated as limitations or restrictions to the right to remain together as a 
family, free from external intervention. Principles defined by the ECtHR have become a 
                                                 
 
38 HOYANO AND KEENAN (2007, pp. 22-23). 
 
39 On these stages of the Art. 8 test, see for instance KILKELLY (2000a, pp. 23-33).  
40 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (1), No. 10465/83, 24 March 1988: “the circumstances in which it may be necessary 
to take a child into public care and in which a care decision may fail to be implemented are so variable that it would 
scarcely be possible to formulate a law to cover every eventuality” (par. 62).  
 
41 ECtHR W. v. the UK, No. 9749/82, 8 July 1987: “to require them [the local authorities] to follow on each 
occasion an inflexible procedure would only add to their problems. There must therefore be allowed a measure of 
discretion in this respect “(par. 62).  
 15
InDret 2/2010  Josep Ferrer Riba 
paramount contribution to the creation of a European system of child protection. They 
relate to procedural issues, to the decisions to take children into public care or place them 
for adoption; to the implementation of protective measures, and to the refusal to terminate 
care or the upholding of other restrictions.  
 
a) Procedural principles  
 
Procedures bear significant influence on the substance of decisions taken by administrative 
bodies and courts. Everyone is entitled to a fair trial in the determination of his or her civil 
rights (Art. 6 ECHR). The vast array of guarantees encompassed by the right to a fair trial 
frequently play a crucial role in child protection cases. They include, among others, the 
right to have decisions restricting or terminating access to children reviewed by a court42; 
the right to have access to information or evidence which has been relied upon by the 
authorities in taking protection measures43 or in reviewing a court’s decision on appeal44; 
the right to legal assistance in proceedings leading to the issuance of care orders or orders 
freeing a child for adoption45; the right to a hearing, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances that justify dispensing with one, and even the right to request that the 
hearing be public, unless there are reasons for excluding the case from public scrutiny46. 
All these are defence rights, derived from the principle of equality of arms, i.e. the 
requirement that each party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case 
under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
opponent.  
 
Interestingly, Art. 8 ECHR contains further procedural requirements. In addition to the 
guarantees included in the right to a fair trial, the Court has come to define a more general 
right “to a sufficient involvement”: the parties whose rights and interests are affected by 
public authority decisions have the right “(to be) involved in the decision-making process, seen 
as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests”47. 
The principle of sufficient involvement has become one of the pillars upon which European 
child protection systems are based. Although there is inevitably some overlap between the 
two sets of procedural rights (those explicitly derived from Art. 6 and those implied in Art. 
8), the principle of involvement in the decision-making process goes further than the right 
to a fair trial and has different goals. It conveys several purposes at once: it is meant to 
                                                 
 
42 ECtHR W. v. the UK, cited above n. 41; Eriksson v. Sweden, cited above n. 33.  
 
43 ECtHR Mc Michael v. the UK, No. 16424/90, 24 February 1995.  
 
44 ECtHR Buchberger v. Austria, No. 32899/96, 20 December 2001. 
 
45 ECtHR P., C. and S. v. the UK, No. 56547/00, 16 July 2002.  
 
46 ECtHR Moser v. Austria, No. 12643/02, 21 September 2006. 
 
47 ECtHR W. v. the UK, cited above n. 41.  
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foster cooperation, by including parents’ views and interests among the relevant 
considerations in reaching decisions on child protection; to allow parents to dispel concerns 
expressed about them (e.g. by health care professionals) or to put forward data in their 
favour, and even to enable them to understand and to come to terms with traumatic events 
affecting the family as a whole.  
 
This idea was first stated in T.P. and K.M. v. the UK48, a case of sexual abuse where the mother was 
not permitted to watch a video of the interview in which her daughter disclosed the information 
that she had been abused. The lack of access to this material prevented the mother from realizing 
that the authorities had wrongly identified the abuser. Certainly, the right to have access to all case 
material can be restricted if careful consideration leads to the conclusion that such disclosure could 
place the child at risk: in K.A. v. Finland49, a case where incest was strongly suspected, for instance, 
the decision not to inform the parent of the identities of the persons from whom the suspicion had 
originated was considered understandable.  
 
b) Principles related to decisions about taking children into care  
 
With regard to decisions to take children into care, the law in Europe is rooted in the 
principle of exceptionality, in clear correspondence with Art. 9 UNCRC. Measures 
separating children from their families are exceptional and can only be justified by relevant 
and sufficient reasons. Family law’s approach to child protection – it has recently been 
concluded – revolves around two types of models. It is “polarized between a model premised 
on the central role of the child’s biological family, supported by the state in the protection of the child 
in the future, and a model of permanency which advocates swift court-mandated intervention to 
remove children from abusive environments and place them with new adoptive families”50. ECtHR 
case law has developed from complaints raised by parents and family members against 
administrative or judicial orders which intruded on the family’s autonomy. The fact that 
the Court’s decisions revolve around this type of conflict has given its case law a noticeably 
guarantiste hallmark, very much in tune with the first model mentioned above. Unless 
there is a shift in its principles – which is not expected for the time being – the Court may 
play a significant role in holding back political support for more proactive systems which 
favour attaching the children of deeply dysfunctional parents to new families. 
 
Turning to more specific findings in European case law, the principle of exceptionality 
translates into different standards of discretion in taking decisions about care, depending 
on the degree to which they restrict contact between parents and children. As a matter of 
principle, the European Court admits that the authorities have a wide margin of 
appreciation in assessing the need to take a child into care: cases have to be analyzed as a 
whole and with regard to all their circumstances. However, the degree of latitude in taking 
                                                 
 
48 ECtHR No. 28945/95, 10 May 2001.  
 
49 ECtHR No. 27751/95, 14 January 2003.  
 
50 HOYANO AND KEENAN (2007, p. 23). 
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a decision has to correlate with the gravity of its consequences: administrative or judicial 
orders restricting or depriving parents of their rights or limiting access between children 
and parents or other family members are subjected to stricter scrutiny because they entail 
the danger of child alienation or the curtailment of family relationships51.  
 
In order to assess whether interference is legitimate the Court requires the reasons adduced 
by the authorities for intervention to be explicit, relevant and sufficient. The reasoning has 
to reflect the careful examination which the competent organs can be expected to carry out 
in matters of such magnitude by weighing the evidence militating in favour and against the 
care measure: vague descriptions or references to “documentation on file” are not 
sufficient52. With regard to the requirement of relevance, the Court has observed many 
times that “it is not enough that the child would be better off if placed in care”53. The child must 
have suffered harm or be in danger of suffering harm. In the case of danger, this has to be 
actually established54. The evidentiary basis for deciding to take a child into care may vary 
according to the seriousness of the harm: in cases of sexual abuse or infliction of physical 
ill-treatment, national authorities are entitled to take action on the basis of strong suspicion, 
even if they do not possess actual evidence of the facts55. The requirement for the reasons 
for interference to be sufficient calls for assessing their proportionality to the measures 
adopted, and this normally implies evaluating the alternatives. In fact, failing to carry out a 
thorough assessment of possible alternatives may lead to a violation of the Convention. In 
cases where there were no allegations of neglect or ill-treatment, the Court has been 
particularly assertive in demanding the consideration of additional support measures as an 
alternative to what is by far the most extreme measure, namely the removal of children 
from their parents56. As stated in the case Moser v. Austria57, material shortcomings such as 
inadequate housing or lack of financial means, or unclear residence status which made it 
difficult for a mother to care for a very young child, all require careful examination of the 
possible alternatives to taking a child into foster care. The Court particularly blamed the 
Austrian authorities in Moser for not taking any positive action to explore possibilities 
                                                 
 
51 ECtHR Johansen v. Norway, cited above n. 8.  
 
52 ECtHR K.A. v. Finland, cited above 49.  
 
53 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (1), cited above n. 40 (par. 72).  
 
54 ECtHR Saviny v. Ukraine, No. 39948/06, 18 December 2008.  
 
55 ECtHR Gnahoré v. France, No. 40031/98, 19 September 2000. In this case, a care order had been issued 
because the applicant was suspected of ill-treating the child with intent; he had been charged on that count 
but was subsequently exonerated. Nevertheless, the national authorities renewed the care order, referring 
to the father’s inability to tend to the child’s material needs and the child’s wish to stay in his foster home. 
The European Court considered that these were valid reasons for keeping the child in care.  
56 ECtHR Kutzner v. Germany, No. 46544/99, 26 February 2002.  
 
57 Cited above n. 46.  
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which would have allowed the mother and child to remain together, for instance by 
placing them in a mother-child centre.  
 
With respect to the assessment of the alleged reasons for intervention, a further distinction 
has to be made between emergency orders and normal care orders. By their very nature, 
decisions to adopt emergency care measures are taken on a highly provisional basis and on 
an assessment of the risk to the child carried out on the basis of information available at the 
time, which may be incomplete. On the other hand, involving parents in the decision-
making process may not always be possible or, if it is possible, may not be desirable: if 
parents are viewed as the source of an immediate threat to the child, giving them prior 
warning could deprive the measure of its effectiveness. These restrictions are 
counterbalanced by the duty imposed on the authorities to carry out a careful assessment 
of the proposed measure’s impact as well as of possible alternatives prior to its 
implementation58.  
 
Emergency measures are in any event subject to the “sufficiency test”: in particular, the 
Court has been quite scrupulous in policing the reasons for taking new-born babies into 
public care at the moment of birth. Removing babies from their mothers is an extremely 
harsh step which can only be justified by the existence of extraordinarily compelling 
reasons. If the situation leading to the need for protection is foreseeable, the authorities 
have to examine less intrusive options59. If there is no suspicion of life-threatening conduct, 
supervised contact, for instance, is a more proportionate measure than removing the child.  
 
This principle was upheld in the case of P., C. and S. v. the UK60, where the mother was affected 
by a medical condition involving seeking attention by fabricating or inducing illness in her 
children, with significant physical and psychological damage to them. When she gave birth to 
her third child, the English authorities removed the baby immediately in the light of her 
previous conviction for harming one of her other children. The Court did not consider the 
draconian step of removing the child from her mother after birth to be supported by relevant and 
sufficient reasons, as it was not apparent why the mother and child could not at least spend some 
time together under supervision in hospital. 
 
c) Principles related to the implementation of care decisions  
 
When care decisions have been taken with the aim of attaining subsequent family 
reunification, the ECtHR has placed considerable importance on the question of whether 
the measures implemented were consistent with the aim being pursued. As is the case with 
care decisions, care implementation measures have to be supported by necessary and 
sufficient reasons. There are no sufficient reasons to justify the measures if they impose 
                                                 
 
58 ECtHR K. and T. v. Finland, No. 25702/94, 12 July 2001.  
 
59 ECtHR K. and T., cited above n. 58; Haase v. Germany, No. 11057/02, 8 April 2004.  
 
60 Cited above n. 45.  
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unwarranted restrictions on access or communication among family members and parents 
are thus denied the opportunity to meet their children to an extent and in circumstances 
which are likely to promote the aim of reuniting them61.  
 
Similarly, placing siblings at a great distance from both their parents and each other was 
considered to be in breach of the right to respect for family life, because it adversely 
affected the possibility of contact and weakened the prospects of a successful 
reunification62. The underlying rationale for conducting a strict scrutiny of all measures 
restricting access and contact is that when children remain in the care of social welfare 
authorities or in foster families for a protracted period, the possibility of reuniting them 
with their parents diminishes progressively and can eventually be destroyed.  
 
In addition to the principle of consistency with the ultimate aim of family reunification, the 
European Court has also stressed the duty to conduct a thorough review of measures 
adopted from time to time to assess whether there has been any improvement in the 
family’s situation, and also to ensure that implementing the measures – when this is 
entrusted to the social services or to private non-profit-making organizations – does not 
alter the practical effects of judicial decisions.  
 
The importance of conducting periodic supervisions was evident in the case of Scozzari and 
Giunta v. Italy63. The children in the case had been placed in a community organized as an 
agricultural cooperative where twenty years earlier two employees, who still worked there, had 
been found guilty of the sexual abuse and ill-treatment of some handicapped people staying in 
the community at that time. While not expressing an opinion on the community as such, the 
Court considered that the institution and staff’s background and circumstances should have 
prompted the authorities to increase the level of supervision.  
 
d) Principles related to the termination of care 
 
The Strasbourg court has also been called upon to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions to 
refuse to terminate public care, foster care or even placement for adoption in the light of 
the ECHR. The most common impediments found in cases decided by the Court are the 
lack of improvement in the parents’ situation, the parents’ failure to cooperate with the 
authorities, and children’s becoming strongly attached to their foster carers. With regard to 
the first impediment, the Court has justified the decision not to terminate the care unless 
there is reasonable certainty that any improvement appears to be stable. Being restored to 
his or her parents, only to be taken away again shortly afterwards, would be contrary to the 
                                                 
61 ECtHR Eriksson v. Sweden, cited above n. 33; Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, No. 12963/87, 25 
February 1992.  
 
62 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (1), cited above n. 40.  
 
63 ECtHR No. 39221/98; 41963/98, 13 July 2000.  
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child’s interests64. On the other hand, parents’ failure to cooperate should not constitute an 
absolute decisive factor: their rights are not infringed if the authorities make genuine 
efforts to act in the child’s best interests and the failure of measures implemented to this 
end is due solely to the parents’ behaviour65. Finally, with regard to children who are 
reluctant to return to their natural families because of the strong emotional bonds created 
with their foster parents, the Court has admitted that the possibility of applying coercion is 
limited, since the child’s interests must be taken into account as well as his or her rights66. 
In the case of older children who have persistently indicated that they do not want to leave 
their foster homes, their interests override the natural parents’ wish to regain custody67.  
 
 
4. The increasing interplay between Conventions and their monitoring bodies: 
the incidence of the UN Convention on European Court of Human Rights child 
protection case law  
 
The UNCRC’s legal relevance as a vehicle for child protection in Europe has been 
overshadowed by the large and authoritative body of case law emanating from the ECtHR 
over the past twenty years. The assiduous application of the Rome Convention to 
individual complaints brought by parents, children or other family members against State 
authorities all over Europe clearly shows an international commitment to providing 
effective protection, in spite of the Court’s delays, the limited or symbolic compensation 
awards and the difficulties sometimes encountered in enforcing judgements. On the other 
hand, however, the UNCRC’s paramount position in the international legal order in terms 
of child empowerment, the comprehensiveness of its catalogue of rights and the loftiness of 
its standards cannot be denied. The European Court itself has acknowledged that the 
standards to which all governments must aspire in asserting and defending children’s 
rights are those set out in the 1989 Convention68.  
 
Bearing in mind that all Council of Europe Member States are also party to the UNCRC, the 
question arises of how both Conventions and their respective monitoring systems can 
interrelate and benefit from their complementary strengths. A particularly critical issue is 
whether, and to what extent, the ECtHR and its enforcement mechanisms can draw upon 
UNCRC provisions in ways that advance children’s rights and further the development of 
more progressive child protection frameworks. This approach has already raised 
significant academic interest69.  
                                                 
64 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (1), cited above n. 40. 
 
65 ECtHR Gnahoré v. France, cited above n. 55.  
 
66 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (2), No. 13441/87, 27 November 1992.  
 
67 ECtHR Bronda v. Italy, No. 22430/1993, 9 June 1998. 
 
68 E.g. ECtHR Sahin v. Germany, No. 30943/96, 8 July 2003. 
69 See for instance KILLKELY (2000 and 2001b); VAN BUEREN (2007, pp. 18-23); VERHEYDE (2007).  
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Even though the ECHR cannot be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the 
children’s human rights enshrined in the UNCRC (Art. 53 ECHR), applications are 
admitted by the Strasbourg Court only from persons who claim to be victims of violations 
of the rights set out in the European Convention (Art. 34 ECHR) and not of rights 
enshrined in other Conventions or international treaties. According to Art. 32 ECHR, the 
Court’s jurisdiction extends exclusively to interpreting and applying the European 
Convention. Nevertheless, in doing this in a dynamic manner – as it has done for decades – 
the Court may resort to principles, standards or values laid down in other human rights 
instruments, including the UNCRC. The Court has in fact followed this approach in its case 
law regarding the physical punishment of children, juvenile justice and child protection. 
On most occasions this has been done implicitly, without any mention of the sources of its 
inspiration, but in some cases the Court has explicitly referred to the UNCRC or to CRC 
recommendations, using them, as one author has put it, as an additional instrumental layer 
of legitimacy and guidance70. 
 
Some recent examples may help to illustrate this. In K. T. v. Norway71, a Norwegian 
national, the father of two children and separated from his wife, was subject to several 
investigations carried out by child welfare services. These investigations, which were quite 
intrusive, were ordered as a result of concerns, expressed by his wife and confirmed by 
anonymous reports, that he was abusing intoxicating substances and that the children were 
at risk of violence. The father, who also suffered from a psychiatric disorder, sought to 
obtain a judgement declaring that there was no legal basis for conducting these 
investigations. By way of a preliminary observation, the ECtHR noted that the 
investigation fell within the range of measures envisaged in Article 19 UNCRC to be taken 
in order to prevent the abuse and neglect of children (“Such protective measures should, as 
appropriate, include effective procedures ... for other forms of prevention and for identification, 
reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment 
described heretofore ...”). This was an important consideration to be borne in mind in 
assessing the necessity to interfere in the private and family life of the person being 
investigated.  
 
Another relevant case, which also alludes to Art. 19 UNCRC (whose second section 
requires that protective measures should include effective procedures for the identification, 
reporting and referral of instances of child maltreatment), is Juppala v. Finland72. In Juppala 
the Court discussed whether a criminal conviction imposed on a grandmother for 
defamation without better knowledge, after she told a doctor in good faith of her suspicion 
that her three-year-old grandson had been assaulted by his father, was in conformity with 
                                                 
 
70 VAN BUEREN (2007, p. 19).  
 
71 ECtHR No. 26664/03, 25 September 2008. 
 
72 ECtHR No. 18620/03, 2 December 2008.  
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the ECHR. The child himself appeared to have said that his father had hit him, and 
repeated this version to the doctor, but the suspicion could not be confirmed. The Court 
held that any individual should have the possibility of voicing a suspicion of child abuse, 
formed in good faith, in the context of an appropriate reporting procedure, without the 
potential “chilling effect” of a criminal conviction. This judgement not only takes the 
aforementioned Art. 19 UNCRC into consideration but also the CRC’s concluding 
observations in its third report on Finland73 as relevant international materials. Among 
other suggestions, the CRC had recommended that Finland strengthen measures to 
encourage the reporting of instances of child abuse, bearing in mind that violence against 
children is one of the most serious obstacles to the full implementation of children’s rights 
in Finland. 
 
In three other recent cases the European Court has shown itself to be highly attentive to the 
observations made by the CRC in response to reports submitted by two States (the Czech 
Republic in two cases, and Ukraine) in compliance with Art. 44 UNCRC. At stake in all 
three cases (Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic74; Havelka and others v. the Czech 
Republic75, and Saviny v. Ukraine76) were national authority decisions to place children in 
public care, mainly on the grounds that their parents faced serious material difficulties in 
providing suitable housing for them. In the Wallowá and Havelka cases, the parents’ lack of 
effort to overcome their financial difficulties (plus evidence of alcohol consumption and 
uncooperative behaviour in Havelka) seem to have led the authorities to conclude that the 
children’s health and personal development were at risk. In the Saviny case, the authorities 
found that the parents – who were blind – were unable to provide their children with 
proper nutrition, clothing, a sanitary environment and health care, and to ensure their 
social and educational upbringing, by virtue of insufficient financial means and personal 
qualities. However, in none of the three cases were there any signs of relevant affective or 
educational deficiencies. The Court’s judgements found a violation of Art. 8 ECHR, holding 
that the decisions to put the children into care were disproportionate to the aim being 
pursued. Particularly pertinent here is the reference – among other relevant legal sources – 
to Art. 9 UNCRC and to the CRC’s observations upon consideration of the national reports 
submitted by the Czech Republic and Ukraine. These observations pointed to the 
insufficiency of financial resources for assisting families, the inadequacy of family therapy 
because of the lack of social workers, and serious concerns about the use of institutional 
placement as a solution to social problems and critical situations within families.  
 
The Court did not draw explicitly on these observations to support its finding of 
Convention violations. However, the bulk of the argumentation was clearly in tune with 
                                                 
 
73 CRC/C/15/Add. 272.  
 
74 ECtHR No. 23848/04, 26 October 2006.  
 
75 ECtHR No. 23499/06, 21 June 2007. 
 
76 ECtHR No. 39948/06, 18 December 2008.  
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concerns raised by the Committee. The Court pointed out the need to actually prove the 
existence of danger to the children and to assess whether inadequacies in the children’s 
upbringings were attributable to the parents’ irremediable incapacity to provide care, as 
opposed to their financial difficulties. To this end, it emphasized the importance of 
gathering specific information on the volume and sufficiency of social assistance provided 
to these families, the specific recommendations they could have received by way of 
counselling, and the reasons why these recommendations might have failed. With such 
information missing, no evaluation could be conducted as to whether the authorities had 
discharged their obligation to promote family unity or whether they had sufficiently 
explored the effectiveness of less far-reaching alternatives before splitting up the families. 
This line of reasoning is clearly in tune with Art. 9 UNCRC, the Recommendation of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on policy to support positive parenting77 
and the Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children78 (Part IV: Preventing the need for 
alternative care).  
 
The ECtHR’s reliance on UNCRC provisions and CRC recommendations and standards to 
provide support for its own findings is a promising development for children’s rights. 
However, full recognition of these rights is still some way off. It should not be forgotten 
that the Court and the UN Committee have taken divergent approaches to children’s issues 
in the past, such as in the areas of physical punishment and the child’s right to know his or 
her parents as part of the right to identity79. The CRC has shown a principled position 
against all forms of physical punishment and violence against children and has raised 
concerns regarding the legal admissibility of anonymous birth-giving and States Parties’ 
policies in relation to artificial insemination (keeping donors’ identities secret) because this 
prevents children from obtaining information which is essential to their right to identity80. 
On the other hand, the ECtHR has taken a more pragmatic position in both fields. It has 
tolerated some forms of physical punishment, arguing that whether a punishment reaches 
the minimum threshold of severity required to infringe Art. 3 ECHR depends on the 
circumstances of each case81. It has also condoned the practice of anonymous birth-
giving82, and has not objected to preserving the anonymity of gamete donors for the 
purposes of assisted reproduction because of the lack of consensus among Council of 
Europe Member States on this question83.  
                                                 
77 Cited above n. 20. 
 
78 Cited above n. 27. 
 
79 VAN BUEREN (2007, pp. 20-22).  
 
80 NEWELL (2000, 117-120); O’DONOVAN (2000, pp. 77-81).  
 
81 ECtHR Costello-Roberts v. the UK, No. 13134/87, 25 March 1993.  
 
82 ECtHR Odievre v. France, No. 42326/98, 13 February 2003.  
 
83 ECtHR X., Y. and Z. v. the UK, No. 21830/93, 22 April 1997.  
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More intense interaction between Conventions could also perhaps contribute to 
overcoming the well-founded criticism that the European Court does not promote 
children’s independent claims as opposed to those of their parents84. Applicants to the 
ECtHR in child protection cases are usually parents fighting for their rights, not children. 
The core issue under discussion in ECtHR cases is whether public authorities have 
illegitimately interfered with the right to lead an undisturbed family life. This right belongs 
to parents as well as children: as the Court has repeatedly stated, the mutual enjoyment by 
parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life 
which is protected under the Convention. However, in the cases decided by the Court, the 
personal interests of parents and children which underlie their respective rights are not 
always aligned. They may even conflict. When public authorities have felt compelled to 
intervene in family life by using coercive measures, the assumption that parents’ and 
children’s interests coincide turns out to be significantly weakened. Children, in particular, 
may have countervailing interests of their own in not being forced to endure a state of 
uncertainty as to whether they will ultimately have to live with their original families or 
with foster or adoptive parents. These are distinct children’s interests which sometimes go 
unnoticed or are not given due weight in the proceedings.  
 
According to ECtHR case law, when a conflict brings parents and the authorities who have 
placed their child or children into public custody into opposition, the parents’ standing 
suffices to afford them the necessary power to apply to the Court on behalf of the children 
too in order to protect their interests, even if they do not hold parental responsibility for 
them85. This jurisprudential doctrine is highly controversial: although children have the 
same right as their parents to enjoy a family life free from state intervention, in certain 
circumstances they may have no interest in asserting this right, or they may have but in 
different conditions to those sought by their parents. In practice the Court’s doctrine 
presupposes that the vindication of any autonomous child’s right or interest which 
diverges from their parents’ interest remains in the hands of the defendant State, which 
nevertheless may be primarily concerned with defending decisions taken by the internal 
authorities rather than with the defence of the child’s rights. As a matter of fact, there is no 
provision in the ECHR which directs States to take children’s best interests into account 
when deciding matters affecting them86. 
 
The fact that children’s views are all too-often absent or appear much-diluted in the 
proceedings says a great deal about the nature of the relevant considerations in Strasbourg 
cases. Although children are normally heard in national courts, this does not always 
happen, and even if it does, it may be several years before the case reaches the ECtHR. 
                                                 
 
84 FORTIN (1999, 237-241; 2005, pp. 54-56).  
 
85 ECtHR Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, cited above n. 63, and Moser v. Austria, cited above n. 46.  
 
86 FORTIN (2005, pp. 56-60).  
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Since the European Court does not act as a fact-finding court, children are not heard here 
either. This is not to say that the European Court systematically ignores or underplays 
children’s rights and interests. Several of its judgements point out the need to strike the 
right balance between the child’s interest (e.g., in remaining with the foster parents) and 
the natural family’s interest (typically, in obtaining the child’s return to the family home). 
The Court admits that the possibility of applying coercion to enforce parents’ rights is 
limited since the child’s interests and rights under Art. 8 must also be taken into account in 
achieving this balance87. The Court has even attached overriding weight to the steadfast 
wishes of two children aged eight and fourteen to keep their father’s access rights 
restricted88 and those of a fourteen-year-old girl to remain with her foster family89. All in 
all, the overall impression is that the appreciation of the child’s best interests does not 
operate systematically, nor does it always necessarily carry the paramountcy assigned to it 
by the UNCRC, as it has to be reconciled with the respect owed to parental rights. 
Furthermore, this approach of focusing on the appreciation of the child’s welfare fails to 
articulate the concept of the child as an independent player, with rights of his or her own90, 
including the right – not so far recognised by the ECtHR as a general right – to be heard 
and have his or her view taken into account91. This is a shortcoming which is also present 
in EU law dealing with children: children’s rights are too often instrumental to other major 
policy goals, are made dependent on the exercise of their parents’ rights or are simply 
played down under a welfarist approach which prioritises parental entitlements92.  
 
Given the European Court’s institutional function and historical determining factors, it will 
not be easy to overcome the current situation, in which child protection cases brought 
before the Court are analyzed and decided as a contest between parents and child 
protection authorities while the child’s individual position remains in the background. 
Greater sensitivity towards children’s rights, and in particular their participation rights, as 
enshrined by Art. 12 UNCRC (and also by the 1996 European Convention on the Exercise 
of Children’s Rights), should lead to the welfare principle (Art. 3.1 UNCRC) being applied 
in a more consistent and generalized way in judging both the legitimacy of public 
interferences with family life and the enforceability of parents’ rights. In the same way, 
there should be a clear recognition of children’s autonomous legal standing in the 
proceedings, and of the need to appoint a special representative on their behalf (a guardian 
                                                 
87 ECtHR Olsson v. Sweden (2), cited above n 66.  
 
88 ECtHR No. 25651/94, L. v. Finland, 27 April 2000.  
 
89 ECtHR Bronda v. Italy, cited above n. 67.  
 
90 FORTIN (2005, p. 59).  
 
91 VERHEYDE (2007, p. 117).  
 
92 MCGLYNN (2006, pp. 42-77, pp. 169-171).  
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ad litem or other appropriate body) whenever there is a risk of a conflict of interests with 





The process of convergence of family law in Europe is advancing at a speed which was 
hardly foreseeable two decades ago. Child protection law is keeping pace with this 
dynamic. The application of the European Convention has harmonized national 
authorities’ legal practice patterns, has set limits to their discretionality and has imposed 
positive duties of protection on them. Although the European Court has primarily been 
prompted to intervene with the aim of preserving parents’ freedom, it has also acted – 
albeit unsystematically – to defend children rights and has tried to ensure the precedence 
of the child’s best interests in the event of conflict. The progressive incorporation of the 
principles laid down by the ECtHR into national legal systems has implicitly facilitated the 
creation of a common system of international private law within the EU.  
 
Perhaps now is the time to take a step further and set out the substantive principles of child 
protection law in a formal text, as has already been done in other areas of family law, with 
the aim of facilitating its spreading and better cognisance. This project should revolve 
around the consideration of the child as a subject entitled to legal protection and to live in a 
secure and stable family environment which guarantees, as far as possible, his or her full 
personal development. To this effect, European principles should be nourished not only by 
the international instruments drawn up by the Council of Europe and ECtHR case law, but 
also, and chiefly, by the UNCRC. Beyond the drafting of a set of principles, the prospects 
for a future European unification of child protection law remain largely uncertain. Such a 
task should be preceded by a gradual approximation of cultural contexts, professional 
values, operating legal procedures, institutional frameworks in family law, and, in 
particular, national family and welfare policies.  
                                                 
 
93 KILKELLY (2000, p. 99).  
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